(AFCS) based on neoclassical production theory. Variants of his AFCS methodology were later adopted not only by many academic economists but also by economic analysts at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who were responsible for gauging the size of the Soviet economy. (It should be noted that the CIA's calculations included adjustments for proªts and for interest on ªxed capital-adjustments that were not envisaged or endorsed by Abe.) In the 1970s and early 1980s a number of Western economists proposed alternative methodologies, but these approaches tended to be highly idiosyncratic and were based on unclear or ad-hoc adjustments. As a result, factor-cost valuation remained the dominant procedure for measuring the Soviet economy.
Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed and vastly more information is available, it is clear that the adjustments in Abe's model were insufªcient to compensate for the imperfections of Soviet data and the peculiarities of the Soviet economy. As Abe himself acknowledged in an article he published in the Autumn 1991 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the estimates produced by the CIA (using a version of AFCS) overstated Soviet gross output and consumption by a sizable margin. The basic problem, as Vladimir Kontorovich has noted, was that AFCS assumed cost minimization (a core assumption of neoclassical production theory), whereas evidence of producer behavior in the investment goods and services sector of the Soviet economy shows that the reality was one of cost maximization (because it allowed producers to raise their prices and thus increase their gross value of output). Despite this ºaw in AFCS, there is no question that Abe's many contributions to the study of the Soviet economy were of immense and lasting importance.
When I ªrst met Abe in the mid-1980s as a graduate student, I spoke with him at length about his sense of where the Soviet economy was heading. I was struck by his willingness to discuss these matters so thoroughly and patiently with a mere graduate student who was nearly ªfty years younger than he. At that point I addressed him as "Professor Bergson," but when I became an assistant professor at Harvard the following year, I began calling him "Abe," a move that seemed quite daring. (Many of Abe's former students, including some who later became his colleagues, continued to call him "Professor Bergson" for decades afterward.) Subsequently, Abe and his wife, Rita, invited me to their house numerous times and also invited a friend of mine, Heidi Kroll, an economist specializing on the Soviet Union. Heidi and I greatly enjoyed the opportunity to meet informally with the Bergsons (including one time when we all went swimming at the Bergsons' country club), and I am proud to have known Abe and Rita as friends. I will deeply miss Abe's presence at the Davis Center, where he will always be remembered for his probing (at times intimidating) questions during the daily coffee hours and the weekly economists' seminars. Abe was often mentioned as a candidate for the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the annual award established in 1968 by the Bank of Sweden. Although he did not ultimately receive the prize, the esteem in which he is-and will continue to be-held in the economics profession and in the ªeld of Soviet studies is of an equivalent scale.
